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発 表 題 名 （英　　語）	An Intrusion of Skepticism: 　The Genealogy of Truth in Levinasian Thought
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Emmanuel Levinas' *Totality and Infinity* provides an innovative account of the connection between intimate and public spheres through the notion of language. On the one hand, "language", in the Levinassian sense of the term, is considered an opening toward social relationships with the "Other" by introducing the ethics dimension. On the other hand, as opposed to this face-to-face attitude, the intimate relationship with "feminine" is characterised by anti-language. This difference is rather enigmatic, and leaves open the question of interplay — or contamination — between these two kinds of connections. In order to explain this interplay, I have scrutinised the notion of "skepticism" as one of the key terms in Levinassian philosophy. According to Levinas, skepticism is taken as language itself — "Language is already skepticism," he claims — and it is also a kind of anti-language that falls permanently into the realm of self-contradiction or "non-sense".

Skepticism is closely interlaced with research on the criterion of truth. Levinas sets three preliminary criteria that should lead us to the definitive truth under the notion of "prophecy" in *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*. I analyse how skepticism is introduced in every one of these three stages toward this last criterion, and in each step, the problem of skepticism is closely linked with the Levinassian concept of "there is" (*il y a*), or being without entities, the infinite negation of the positioning of the entities.

First, I scrutinise his critical assessment of Edmund Husserl's concept of truth found as self-giving intuition. Husserl, rejecting Cartesian methodological skepticism as a tentative that stops half way, discovers a transcendental subjectivity that could perform the "observation of the self" and reveals the lived experience as "adequate". Thus, he refutes the skeptical objections of Henry J. Watt that question the effectiveness of "adequate" knowledge in the observation of the self. Levinas considers Watt's skepticism as "by no means negligible". He

takes the Husserlian neutralization as "negation of negation" and claims that this last negation could be negated, and so on *ad infinitum*. This schema was the Levinassian concept of "there is" in "Totality and Infinity", which makes us suppose that the Husserlian neutralization remains insufficient.

Following the change in Levinas' gaze from Husserl to Heidegger, in the second part of my paper, I scrutinise the so-called Heidegerrian openness of the "Being" and its connection with the Wattian type of skepticism. I then clarify how Levinas performs, by reintroducing the concept of "there is" as the transition from the Heideggerian criterion of the truth to his own criterion as a production of the "being" described in *Totality and Infinity*.

Finally, in the third part of my paper, I demonstrate, through a significant criticism made by Derrida, who considered the Levinassian discourse a performative contradiction sharing its structure with "skepticism", of the way Levinas refutes this objection by accepting the risk of skeptical language and reformulates the criteria of truth as the production of "being" to the ultimate criterion of truth revealed in "prophecy".

Therefore, every stage of this itinerary is marked by the tides of skepticism that has a profound impact on Levinas' pursuit of the ultimate criterion of truth. It shows further that only beginning from skepticism, taken as an interminable negation as "non-sense", one can hope to find oneself facing the "sense".

During the conclusive discussion, I received questions about the notion of the prophecy and about my positive reinterpretation of the notion of "there is". The latter inspired me to further analyse the relation between the "non-sense" of anti-language in intimate relations and "non-sense" of skepticism as a language.

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